Seneca Rocks Accident 8/5
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The belayer did not feel the weight of the climber loading the rope! this seems important how could that be the case? pinching of the rope on the rock by the carabiner? condolences to all involved …. Very sad |
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I’m going to send my pictures of the cut rope to Ryan J at HowNotTo, I personally removed them from this thread as the family asked me to, but I feel like maybe if he saw them we could find out more. Or at least come to a more complete conclusion |
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rope should go to a lab and be tested for contaminants. |
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I was brought here from HowNot2's video and I have a theory based on Patrick Hoffman's report and Thomas Edward's witness report that this failure was a combination of a pinched rope causing high fall factor and core failure while abrasion caused sheath failure. I believe hotos of the equipment (rope, carabiner etc) and the rock where failure occurred would help confirm and perhaps others with more knowledge of rope failure can comment if this makes sense. Patrick Hoffman wrote: Belayer never feeling load indicates it was taken elsewhere, most likely at the carabiner where failure was determined to occur. This would have caused a near factor 2 fall regardless of whether belayer was pulling slack in while climber fell. Based off the information available it does appear the rope was pinched between the carabiner and slab and this pinching of the rope would have put compression force on the rope. Others have already theorized about rope shear failure which is similar to my theory albeit I don't think it was a true shear failure. Evidence points to the rope being cut by the carabiner on the extended alpine draw attached to the #3 Camalot. The carabiner attached to the fully extended alpine draw was found lying on a slabby portion of rock just below the #3 with the fuzzy remains from the sheath inside the carabiner. No other sheath material was found on any rock edges or face. Photos from the accident scene show approximately 7’ of rope extending from the tie-in at the leaders harness. There was 3”-4” of core exposed where the rope cut. The core was “exploded”. The individual bundles of the core were all cut at the same length indicating a definitive “cut” versuse extended shredding over an edge.. If the belayer took in two-three pulls of rope (2’-4’?) the leader could have been 9’-11’ above his last piece when he let go. No sheath material being found on rock is one detail that may disagree with this theory but perhaps it just wasn't deposited on rock (more likely if rock was sharp) or it fell off (sounds like investigation was done the next day).
If I am interpreting this correctly there appears to have been some sort of edge (whether sharp, curved etc) present below and to both sides of the carabiner where failure occurred. This is supported by Thomas Edwards witness report. Did that edge happen to be 3-4 inches away from the carabiner and coincide with the difference in core vs sheath failure length (sounds like it would be close)?
So to sum up my theory. As per HowNot2's request I will proposed a couple tests for him to run based on this theory. |
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“From the top of the second pitch, the leader placed a 0.75 Camalot just above the belay before initially attempting to climb up and left which would have taken the leader to the Muscle Beach finish (5.8). Encountering a wasp nest, the leader stepped back down to the belay and then stepped down again and right about 5 feet from the belay. The leader then placed a second 0.75 Camalot before moving up and left to a second alcove, about 8’ above and to the right of the belay. Here, the leader placed a #3 Camalot in a shallow, slightly flaring pocket. (This piece was found with both extended and non-extended alpine draws attached.) At this point, the second .75 Camalot was removed to prevent excessive rope drag. The leader attempted to move up and right from this stance, which is the proper direction for the standard finish. This requires the leader to move out over a roof on a short 4’ face and is very exposed. Though there is gear here, you cannot see it until you have committed to the that section of face and then the placement is behind you and at your waist. (The hand holds here could be described as less than inspiring as this is one of the places water drains off the crag above, adding a polished feel to the rock.) The leader stepped back down to the previous stance and discussed options with the belayer. During this period, the sun was peeking over the top, making route finding more difficult. The climbing team discussed options before the leader decided to move up and left. Climbing above the last piece and not finding additional protection, the leader called down to the belayer, informing them that he was going to jump/fall (acknowledging it was “going to be a big one”). The leader then let go, falling somewhere between 11-12 feet before loading the rope. The belayer reported having time to take in maybe 2-4 feet of slack before hearing the very loud “gunshot” of the rope exploding. The belayer never felt the falling climber load the belay and the leader fell approximately 130 feet to the ground.” Can someone that knows this climb chime in? According to this description the leader was about 20ft above the belay with 2 pieces in when he took the fall? Seems like in a mostly straight line above the belay. What would then cause belay side of rope not to load then on such a short run and only two pieces? Condolences to all involved. |
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Nick Goldsmith wrote: Actually a way better idea! Most definitely |
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First, my deepest condolences to those effected by this tragedy. |
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Even Ryan in his video repeats the conventional wisdom that the only way to F2 is falling at P2+ anchor w/o another piece in, but in light of this accident we have to chuck that. Under the right conditions you could F2 (or worse) any time you’re above protection and there’s almost nothing your belayer can do because he’s out of the system at that point. |
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Can someone comment on the diameter of the rope? |
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Doug S wrote: Omg no. There was no FF2 here. It was a sharp edge. |
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Tradiban wrote: If the rope blocks at the top piece with no pay out, it is at least ff2. |
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I feel like the last video I linked doesn't quite illustrate the scenario I laid out well enough. So here is another one that better shows how it could jam the sheath into the biner, putting the core into dire straights. |
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Victor Creazzi wrote: It didn’t. |
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My sincere condolences to Danny’s family, friends, climbing partners, first responders and anyone else impacted by this tragedy. I am monitoring this thread to better understand the accident specifics so as to be a better informed climber. That said, I am surprised by the endless focus on the rope and carabiner scenarios. Something went wrong there (and we’d all like to know exactly what) but whatever it was, it seems to be a very low probability, high consequence event. On the other hand, no one is talking about the fact that the deceased opted, evidently, to jump down from his last piece. If there’s any actionable learning to be had, it sure seems like it’s to never do this if it can be avoided. I’m not sure I understand this part of the accident. Why would he do that? If bailing, why not downclimb as far as possible or at least carefully and steadily weight the piece first to the best of his abilities? I must be missing something crucial here. Thanks for your help in understanding. |
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Anna Barensfeld wrote: Rereading the report again, I suppose the assumption is he could not downclimb to his last piece so he had to jump/fall from above it? And that it was impossible for him to place any more pro. |
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Because sometimes you cant down climb and a controlled jump/ fall feels safer than an uncontrolled fall. This is not a freak accident. Sharp edges are something you should always be on the lookout for. This climb and this area has them in abundance. I usually have a roll of hockey tape on my person and have been known to tape over sharp edges on occasion. I also climb with double ropes on this cliff and many others. The victim did not do anything really wrong other than getting off route and having to take a fall in a bad spot. the biggest takeaway should be to try not to climb yourself into a bad spot and don't take falling for granted. |
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Nick Goldsmith wrote: I guess I’d like to hear more discussion about how to proceed to take all possible precautions should we find ourselves in Danny’s situation or similar, if there’s any precaution to be taken other than taking a controlled fall vs uncontrolled. I feel that’s far more actionable than hoping that our biners and ropes don’t end up in this precise, highly unlikely scenario (and yes, of course extending and avoiding sharp edges as far as possible etc. etc.). In other words, is there anything that could have been done better by Danny? Please don’t read this as criticizing him. I’m not. I just want to learn from this tragedy. |
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Anna Barensfeld wrote: The discussion is focused on the failure mode of the rope (in my opinion) because it's the variable with the most mystery. If you climb long enough, you WILL climb yourself into a position that you can't go up or down and have to take a controlled fall. I've accepted the focus on the rope failure mode to be because most participating in the discussion have taken for granted the understanding that the controlled fall ("jump") was necessary, likely from personal experience doing the same themselves. If time isn't spent trying to define and understand the scenario where what is assumed to be an otherwise healthy and functional rope suffered a catastrophic failure,d we may end up seeing a repeat. In my 20+ years of climbing, I have actually seen discussions like these change how we climb and protect climbs. It may not seem important, but if it's not discussed to some end then we risk losing more beloved climbing friends. Your point is also valid for discussion, but it's not more or less actionable than working to understand the failure mode of the rope. It's just a different area for discussion in this accident. |
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Anna Barensfeld wrote: Practice and get really good at downclimbing. If you can downclimb one grade less than you can lead, it will drastically reduce your need for jumping/falling. Practice and get really good at placing gear in challenging places. Lots of people are only good at placing cams these days, because that's the only gear they ever place. Get yourself some brassies and ballnuts and train your eyes to find good gear placements in between the good cam placements (not true for all types of rock). ... and, no, the development of new, fancy cams have not yet made basic nutcraft obsolete. |
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Anna Barensfeld wrote: Down climbing is an under-rated skill, if impossible, placing a piece just to take in is much preferable to a fall. Routefinding. Look ahead as far as you can see to plan out the moves and the gear. Rope management. Envision where the rope will run in the event of a fall, when in doubt extend. Gear placement and conservation. It may be better to run it out so the rope can have a straighter line and keep gear for future placements, ties into “route finding”. |